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1. Summary 
Far-right extremism is widespread in the Western Balkans and exists in both mainstream political 
parties and extremist groups and individuals. Most of the literature focuses on Serbian nationalist 
groups, but far-right groups are also present in Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, 
Albania and North Macedonia. 
While their precise aims differ, far-right groups share many of the following principles: 
 Ethnically based politics. 
 Reference to the 1990s wars. 
 Glorification of war criminals and ethnic cleansing from the 1990s. 
 A belief in victimisation. 
 A desire to redraw boundaries on ethnic lines. 
 Hatred or ‘securitisation’ of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) groups. 
 The use of violence. 
 Anti-Nato and anti-EU politics. 
 Pro-Russian attitudes and links. 
 Links with organised crime. 
The literature focuses on explaining far right extremism in relation to the political cultures of the 
countries. It notes continuities with the politics of the 1990s in terms of organisations, personnel 
and nationalist ideas. Many far-right groups centre on continuing disputes over borders and 
ethnic victimisation in the Balkans, to which the ‘ethnic democracy’ practised by today’s political 
elites contributes. It also notes the perceived ‘Europeaness’ of liberal ideas on LGBT and 
women’s rights, against which some groups contrast their traditional, Orthodox, Eurasian or 
Slavic values. The spread of these discourses are analysed through media and internet sources. 
Far-right groups are shown to be linked to football supporters’ clubs, and to have experience in 
the Balkan wars or the recent Ukraine conflict in some cases. Sub-regional links within the 
Balkans are important, as are links with Russia, and there is some evidence of wider 
international links. Some studies look at relative social deprivation, criminal backgrounds and 
high levels of unemployment across the region, but most focus on political culture. The perceived 
threat of Islam is a theme of many groups, as well as migrants entering Europe through the 
Balkans. Far right groups are shown to be enabled by mainstream politics and institutions which 
agree with some of their extreme ideas and fail to clamp down on groups. 
There is more research on Islamic violent extremism than far-right violent extremism in the 
region, although the number of publications on the issue has risen since 2017 (Kursani, 2019). 
The most recent literature comes from think tanks and foreign policy sources. Academic 
literature, focused on political parties and discourse analysis, covers a slightly earlier period. The 
area which has generated most writing is Serbian nationalism, including nationalist groups as 
well as foreign fighters in Ukraine. The literature on the other countries is dominated by 
discussion of Islamic extremism, often from a security angle. While women are mentioned as 
participants in Islamic extremism, there is little information on women in right-wing extremism, 
except for conservative views on gender roles. Although the criminal backgrounds of foreign 
fighters are noted, as well as some Serbian and Albanian groups’ links with organised crime, this 
theme is not expanded on in the literature. 
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2. Main themes 
Definitions and context 
Scholars and observers use a range of different terms to describe the same groups and ideas in 
the Western Balkans, including radical right, extreme rights, right-wing extremist, neo-fascist, 
neo-Nazi, neo-populist, anti-immigrant, ultra-right or far right, new right and right populist 
(Stojarová, 2014, p. 9). Perry notes a similar problem, as these terms can all be used to describe 
shared views such as nativism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and anti-Islam sentiment (Perry, 
2019). Such groups may identify with different historical ideologies, such as the Serbian 
Chetniks, or for or against Yugoslavian communist policies, making for some terminological 
confusion. Indeed, right-wing groups in the Balkans are more likely to be left-wing on economic 
matters than those elsewhere (Buštíková, 2018). Most right-wing groups advocate some form of 
border change based on ethnicity and well as animosity to other ethnic groups, sexual minorities 
and liberalism. 
There is no agreed definition of terrorism beyond the use of violence for an ideological end. 
Whether a group is labelled terrorist or not is often linked to the legitimacy conferred on its 
actions. Some scholars instead use the term ‘radicalisation’. The term is used to describe 
pathways for people to ‘adopt and perhaps even act on extreme views’ which take them away 
from social norms and towards unlawful acts (Perry, 2019). However, ‘Critics of contemporary 
radicalisation discourse point out that ‘radicalisation’ has come to be associated almost 
exclusively with violent jihadi terrorism and is much less prevalent in discussions around other 
types of violent extremism and terrorism, such as the extreme right’ (Balkans, 2018).  
Indeed, notions of radicalisation depend on the context in which the radicalised operate. In the 
Balkans, a number of nationalistic, anti-feminist and anti-LGBT views are mainstream. The line 
between holding extreme views and acting on them is also problematic.  Perry notes that USAID 
defines violent extremism as ‘advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting 
ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives’. 
However, the line between holding extreme views and acting on them is hard to discern, while 
those who incite violent extremism but do not themselves perpetrate it may be just as dangerous 
(Perry, 2019). 
According to Perry (2019), ‘there is less a problem of violent extremism in Serbia than there is a 
prevalent and unresolved culture of extremism, grounded in the reciprocal dynamics of the socio-
political ecosystem that has emerged since the wars in the 1990s, and that efforts to transform 
the country (and the region) through support for open and democratic systems have been 
woefully inadequate in addressing the drivers of all kinds of extremisms.’ Indeed, in all of the 
literature surveyed, far right parties are either linked to mainstream parties via coalitions, enabled 
by lax prosecution, or by right-wing discourses. 
Many of the parties and groups involved in the wars of the 1990s are still involved in politics. 
There is a blurring between ‘mainstream’ and extremist parties, who often share views or work in 
coalition. This review therefore focuses on right-wing extremism in the form of groups willing to 
undertake violent action as well as formal political parties. Extremism is taken to include anti-
democratic views, anti-LGBT and gender equality views, advocacy of fascism or theocracy, and 
propagation of ethnic or religious hatred, extreme nationalism and violent action. 
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Religion and nationalism 
The Western Balkans hosts a number of competing forms of far-right and Islamic extremism. The 
term ‘reciprocal radicalisation’ refers to the interplay of extremism, such as Islamic extremism 
and far-right extremism in Serbia, as opposing groups make their views and actions more radical 
based on perceived threats from the other, as well as actions (Perry, 2019). A recent literature 
review of Balkan extremism (far-right and Islamic) ‘suggests that areas (Western Balkans states 
or municipalities) where identity aspects are mixed (ethnic/religious), violent extremism appears 
to be more prominent’, but has not been thoroughly studied, and emphasises the need for 
surveys of the links between ethnic and religious extremism (Kursani, 2019). 
Many far-right groups, particularly in Serbia, use Orthodox imagery or have links with the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. However, religion is not assigned as central a place in analyses of right-wing 
extremism as for Islamic extremism. With respect to Balkans fighters going to fight for Russia in 
Ukraine and Syria, Beslin and Ignjatijevic (2017) state: ‘While the question of shared religion 
stands at the cornerstone of Serbo-Russian relations it did not, unlike with jihadists, represent a 
determining factor for mobilisation’. However, the Serbian Orthodox supports a number of 
extreme positions, particularly on social issues such as LGBT rights or Kosovo through public 
statements or links with far-right groups. Some far-right groups also participate in fundraising 
events for the church (Mills, 2018). 
To understand what motivates individuals to take extremist action, Kursani (2019, p. 24) 
suggests analysing their ‘authority preferences’, to understand ‘what makes individuals prefer 
submitting themselves under and between (i) existing state laws (the established order); (ii) 
religious laws/order; or community authority, which may include individuals’ preferences to take 
community/family authority (be that religious or secular) more seriously than other types of 
authorities’. 
International connections 
Connections between ethnic Serbs in Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo are common, as 
are those between ethnic Albanians in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. Similarly, 
Russian links to right-wing Serbian groups exist from the government level down, most visibly 
shown by the several hundred Balkan citizens fighting for Russia in Ukraine and Syria.  
Some of the links cross ethnic groups, or regions. In 2017, a man wearing a Croatian Defence 
Council shirt, was also involved in storming the parliament in protest at the election of an ethnic 
Albanian speaker, and advocating a Croatian-Macedonian far-right alliance (Ristic, Milekic, 
Zivanovic, & Dzidic, 2017). The British far-right activist Jim Dowson has been active providing 
‘media training’ for far-right groups in Serbia, including filming videos, helping the far-right group 
Order of the Dragon make a website, advising the anti-immigration group Generation Identity on 
social media use, and attending rallies. He has also taken bullet-proof vests to northern Kosovo. 
His international activities have been facilitated by the Knights Templar International (KTI), a 
widely used web portal (Cosic, Marzouk, & Angelovski, 2018). 
A number of authors point to the role of the Balkans in right-wing discourse and networks more 
generally. An article notes that ‘the resurgence of right-wing nationalism in Europe has turned 
Bosnia’s war into an object of lurid nostalgia’ as they look to the Serbian cause in the war as a 
model of a ‘race war’. Aside from those who fought in the Balkans wars, younger figures such as 
Anders Breivek have expressed admiration for convicted war criminals, while the American ‘alt 
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right’ figure Steve Bannon and Russian president Vladimir Putin have met far-right politicians 
from Republika Srpska (Hussain, 2018). 
The internet is an important link in these far-right connections. A survey of far right-internet sites 
in 2017 showed links between groups all over Europe (Balkans, 2018). A recent study found 
more than 60 websites in the Balkans promoting ‘ethnically pure nation states, neo-Nazism, 
violent homophobia and other radical right-wing policies’ (Ristic et al., 2017). Far-right 
organisations cultivate links abroad. For instance, the website of Serbian National Movement 
1389 links to organisations including Poles for Serbian Kosovo, Slovenské Hnutie Obrody, and 
Oboz Wielkiej Polski (Ristic et al., 2017). 
Other studies focus on far-right groups or individuals. A recent study shows how Goran 
Davidovic has used Twitter and other social media to propagate his views. Formerly the leader of 
the banned National Guard, he was sentenced to one year in prison after attacking anti-fascist 
rallies, but fled to Trieste. Using social network analysis and content analysis, Marko (2019) 
shows the main narratives and buzzwords are focused on self-protection and xenophobia, and 
that Davidovic creates relatively ‘horizontal’ relationships with followers. He finds that ‘Instead of 
suggesting specific actions that might be considered to be a targeted call for mobilization, 
Davidović uses provocative and suggestive messages. “Tell them what you think…”; “Remember 
this…” or more explicitly, “Spread your anger…”—’ (Marko, 2019). 
However, the role of internet platforms in mobilising individuals and groups needs to be better 
understood. An Atlantic Initiative study finds ‘no evidence that … frequency of Internet use [is] 
associated with violent extremism (VE) sympathy’ (Atlantic Initiative, 2018). Similarly, Ivanovic’s 
study of internet use among Serbian youth shows that the internet has not been a main driver of 
the recruitment of individuals to extremist groups, which still happens face-to-face (Ivanovic, 
2019).  
3. Serbia 
Prominent parties 
Far right ideas, individuals and parties have remained in prominent positions in Serbian 
politics and society since the fall of the Milosevic government (Dzombic, 2014). This 
includes political parties experiencing success at the ballot box, more extreme fringe groups, 
football hooligans, mercenary fighters and figures in the Orthodox Church, as well as widespread 
public attitudes which may be characterised as far right (particularly relating to certain ethnic 
groups, gender roles and LGBT people). 
The Serbian Radical Party is a conservative, nationalist party which practises xenophobia and 
advocates the unification of territories containing ethnic Serbs in Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. It looks to the history of the Serbian Chetniks, a 
monarchist resistance group in the Second World War, as well as Serbian Orthodoxy (Stojarová, 
2014, p. 48). In 2008-12, it was the second largest party in the National Assembly with 78 out of 
250 seats; in 2012 and 2014 it failed to win any seats; and in 2016, it was the third largest party 
with 22 seats.   
Outside of the larger parties, data on far-right extremist groups is poor. Using police data from 
2011, Dzombic (2014) says there are about 30 active groups with about 5,000 members in total, 
spanning nationalist, Nazi, cleric-fascist ideologies as well as football fans. Three of the largest of 
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these groups are Obraz, the Serbian National Movement (SNP or Naši) and Dveri. Other 
groups include Blood and Honour, National Alignment (officially banned), Stormfront Serbia, 
Serbian Nationalists, Serbian National movement 1389, Nomokanon and the Serbian National 
movement ‘Svetozar miletic’ (Dzombic, 2014). 
Obraz (meaning honour) is a Serbian clerical-fascist organisation. It advocates for theocracy 
using programmes from the 1930s and 1940s programmes. It is against the emancipation of 
women or LGBT people, integration with the EU or NATO, and calls for a Greater Serbia. It was 
banned in 2012, but a successor organisation called ‘Serbian Obraz’ was soon formed (Ivanovic, 
2019; Stakic, 2019).  
The Serbian National Movement (Naši) similarly advocates against Western institutions, LGBT 
rights, equal gender roles, and for the Orthodox faith and a greater Serbia. Naši ‘published a list 
of ‘anti-Serbian’ national traitors. This included media outlets, NGOs and various individuals, all 
of which had allegedly breached the Constitution by supporting the independent Republic of 
Kosovo, and were financed by foreign foundations and embassies’ (Dzombic, 2014).  
Dveri started as a Christian student organisation and advocates conservative Orthodox positions 
on social issues as well as nationalism and fascism. It sees homosexuality as a foreign 
imposition and in 2009 organised a ‘Family Walk’ to promote ‘traditional’ social views (Stakic, 
2019). 
While these groups have not gained significant vote shares nationally, members of Nasi are in 
local government and national coalitions with the New Serbia Party and Serbian Progressive 
Party. Members of Dveri are on the council in Novi Sad and sit in the National Assembly in 
coalition with the Democratic Party of Serbia. 
Other extremist groups include NS—Nova Srbija [New Serbia] and SPO—Srpski Pokret 
Obnove [Serbian Renewal Movement] (Buštíková, 2018). The National Serbian Front/ 
Nacionalni Srpski Front (NSF) advocates national freedom, a greater Serbia, a left-wing 
economic progamme, is ‘against Euro-Atlantic integration in favour of a “Europe of Nations”’, is 
against neoliberal capitalism, argues for both men and women to fight in the army, and is against 
LGBT rights. Serbian action/Srbska akcija (SA) ‘relies on tradition, social welfare and spiritual 
(Orthodox) discipline’. It is anti-capitalist and in favour or monarchical rule and ‘traditional gender 
roles’, as well as a greater Serbia. The Serbian National Movement 1389/ SNP 1389 also 
advocates for a greater Serbia, Orthodox Christianity, Eurasianism, traditional family roles, as 
well as against LGBT rights and drugs. Movement Blood and Honour Serbia/ Pokret krv i 
čast argues for white supremacy and National Socialism. It is against abortion. It advocates 
paganism and rejects (non-pagan) religion, capitalism, communism and human rights (Ivanovic, 
2019).  
Football supporters 
Football supporters groups have taken violent nationalist and anti-LGBT actions, as well 
as non-violent charity and Christian works. Two of the largest are Crvena Zvezda [Red Star 
Belgrade]’s Delije (Valiants) and Partizan Belgrade’s Grobari (Gravediggers).  
The LGBT Pride marches in Belgrade have ‘provided an opportunity for [far-right] supporters’ 
groups to express their collective identities before the gaze of Serbian society and the wider 
world’ (Mills, 2018). Supporters groups also stormed the American embassy after the partial 
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independence of Kosovo in 2008 and usually take nationalist positions on Balkan and global 
politics. They use imagery from the history of Serbian nationalism and Orthodox Christianity. 
Members of Red Star Belgrade’s Delije have been increasingly interested in Orthodox 
Christianity since the 1990s. According to Mills (2018) ‘Before long, Delije members were 
praying collectively at Belgrade’s imposing Church of St. Mark and boycotting matches 
scheduled for the Easter weekend’. They agree with the Church in opposing gay rights and the 
independence of Kosovo. They also undertake a range of charitable as part of their Orthodox 
worldview. For instance 7,000 spectators attended their annual fund-raising concert featuring 
Serbian pop stars: ‘Their rendition of the national anthem, Bože pravde (God of Justice), 
provoked “a storm of emotion” among a crowd who heightened the atmosphere with fares and 
chants drawn from their own repertoire. The whole affair was blessed by the Bishop of the Ras 
and Prizren Eparchy (which encompasses Kosovo), while a hundred children from the Serbian 
enclaves of Kosovo and Metohija were welcomed as special guests. Delije subsequently sought 
the advice of church leaders in determining how best to direct the substantial takings. 
Monasteries, soup kitchens and vulnerable individuals were among the beneficiaries.’ 
Other groups, such as FK Vojvodina’s Firma, have also raised money for ethnic Serbian villages 
in Kosovo. In 2009 Serbian supporters’ groups went with groups from Russia, Poland, Greece 
and other countries for a football tournament in the Kosovan town of Gračanica, home of an 
Orthodox monastery, to commemorate the murder of an ethnic Serb by an Albanian in 2004. The 
visit put a lot of emphasis on prayer and piety instead of more outwardly aggressive forms of 
nationalism. The Serbian football association also hosts disadvantaged ethnic Serb children from 
Kosovo. According to Mills (2018), this charity and religious work has a ‘reaffirming effect’ on the 
supporters’ groups. 
Other football hooligan groups include 
 Ultra Boys 
 Belgrade Boys 
 Ultras 
 Brigate 
 Alkatraz 
 Ludaci – Padinska Skela 
 Anti – Romi 
 South Family 
 Head Hunters 
 Irriducibili – Nbg 
 Shadows 
 Extreme Boys 
 Čuvari Časti 
 Brain Damage i United Force 1987  
(Petrović & Stakić, 2018). 
Although the state prosecutor asked for leading groups to be banned because of their links with 
drug crime, the state has been lax, largely because prominent politicians sit on the boards of the 
clubs (Mills, 2018). 
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Returning fighters 
Many extremists are veterans of the 1990s Balkans wars. It is argued that such fighters 
‘found themselves relegated to the status of underdogs after serving either in paramilitary 
groups, police or special forces during the 1990s wars’ and so rejected the new liberal 
institutions. Fighters also forged links with Russian units in the Yugoslav wars which later helped 
encourage participation in the Russian war in Ukraine (Beslin & Ignjatijevic, 2017).  
Several hundred Serbs have gone to fight in the war in Ukraine as part of the Serbian 
Chetnik movement (Petrović & Stakić, 2018). Estimates vary – a recent publication notes a 
range of 70-300 between authors’ figures (Perry, 2019). Most fight for the Russian side, although 
some may have joined the Ukrainian volunteer battalions. A number of these fighters left Serbia 
to flee criminal records (Beslin & Ignjatijevic, 2017). Some Serb fighters have also joined pro-
Russian parliamentary groups in Syria, fighting as the Serbian Hussar Regiment (Kursani, 2019).  
These fighters are not usually prosecuted, or are treated leniently in comparison to Muslims 
returning from Syria and Iraq. The government encouraged these fighters to return early to avoid 
prosecution under new legislation put in place in 2014 after pressure from the international 
community to deal with Islamist fighters in Iraq and Syria (Beslin & Ignjatijevic, 2017). Despite 
some officials saying that ‘some Serbian Orthodox priests are known to promote a brand of 
extremism that may make them a radicalizing force on par with Salafi ideologues’ and the stated 
ideological motives of the fighters in Ukraine, they are seen as ‘mercenaries’ and so less 
dangerous than Islamic fighters (Azinovic & Becirevic, 2017; Kelmendi & Balaj, 2017).  If they are 
charged, it is for ‘participation in a foreign conflict’ rather than the terrorism charges levelled 
against Islamist fighters. Most go to Ukraine or Syria legally, as humanitarian workers or 
mercenaries for the Russian company Wagner (Petrović & Stakić, 2018). 
A 2018 report gives a list of fighters in Ukraine mentioned in media reports: 
 Bratislav Živković – Commander of the Chetnik Movement. Živković said that his unit 
numbered 15 volunteers from Serbia who arrived in Lugansk in Ukraine via Russia by 
having only tourist visas in their passports.  
 
 Aleksanar Sinđelić – wanted by Ukranian authorities. Arrested in Montenegro for taking 
part in an attempted coup d’etat. He is now a protected witness  
 
 Zoran Andrejić – Deputy Commander of the Chetnik movement. There is no information 
about his whereabouts. 
 
 Radomir Počuča – He got a year and a half suspended sentence  
 
 Dejan Berić – He is still in Ukraine. Very active in (social) media.  
 
 Zdravko Pešić – There is not much information about him  
 
 Milutin Mališić - Commander of Chetnik guard unit “Wolf”.  
 
 Vladimir Stanimirović – Died on the battlefield  
 
 Sasa Karan – After the end of hostilities in Ukraine, he left for Syria where he died 
fighting within Russian units. 
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It also lists several Serbs who fought in Syria, although most of these are Islamists. The list is not 
exhaustive (Petrović & Stakić, 2018).  
State support 
Right wing extremists are supported by the Serbian state. Dzombic argues that ‘ideological 
support for extremists from the Serbian orthodox Church, from many Serbian political parties and 
the majority of media outlets is beyond doubt’ (Dzombic, 2014). Devic argues that extremists’ 
‘liberty and ability to engage in racist, nationalist, and homophobic violence, which spans a wide 
range of activities, from interrupting film screenings to beating or launching racist slurs at Roma 
and African American football players, to volunteering in the Donbass separatist war, stems from 
the fact that they are fully aware of the protracted proceedings in Serbian courts that often end in 
acquittals or lenient rulings for the perpetrators’  (Devic, 2019). 
The state banned Obraz in 2009 and National Alignment in 2011 on the recommendation of the 
prosecutor, but did not ban another two other extremist parties recommended. It has not made 
any efforts to ban offshoots or splinter groups (Dzombic, 2014; Petrović & Stakić, 2018). 
Moreover, some extremist parties hold government positions, or sit in governing coalitions. Dveri 
entered parliament in 2016 in coalition with the Democratic Party of Serbia.  
Main beliefs 
While their programmes differ, most extreme groups defend or deny Serbian war crimes, glorify 
war criminals, complain of the country’s ‘victim status’ at the hands of the West, and oppose anti-
fascism (Dzombic, 2014). They tend to have more left-wing economic policies than far-right 
groups in Western Europe (Buštíková, 2018). Following the Yugoslav wars, while not neglecting 
international politics, extreme groups focused on the ‘internal enemy’: LGBT+, Roma and 
migrants. Some recent attacks led by extreme groups are (Petrović & Stakić, 2018): 
 the anti-Albanian riots in 2004 (incited by the violence against Serbs in Kosovo) in which 
two mosques were set on fire;  
 clashes between neo-Nazis and ANTIFA activists in Novi Sad in 2007;  
 the riots after the declaration of Kosovo independence in 2008 in which a number of 
foreign diplomatic missions and businesses were attacked by the Serbian protesters;  
 riots during the Pride Parade in 2010;  
 attacks on Roma settlements in village Jabuka in 2010, Resnik in 2012, and anti-Roma 
riots in Zemun Polje in 2013;  
 attacks on shops and bakeries owned by ethnic Albanians in Vojvodina, after the incident 
with the flag of the ‘Greater Albania’ at the football match between Serbia and Albania in 
2014 
LGBT rights have become a prominent issue, partly because of the perceived link with Western 
European values. Far right groups have sought to prevent Pride parades in Belgrade through 
denunciation and violence. Even if they do not attack LGBT people, they seek to ‘securitise’ the 
issue by making LGBT rights seem like a threat to the nation, and therefore legitimate targets of 
violence or discriminatory legislation. Dveri, which started as a Christian student organisation, 
organised a family walk in 2009 which talked about homosexuality as a threat to the family and a 
foreign imposition. Obraz, which advocates for theocracy, sees homosexuality as a threat to the 
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Serbian nation. SNP Naši also sees Pride as satanic and a threat to the Serbian family. It has 
drafted a law against ‘gay pride propaganda’ (Stakic, 2019).  
This is facilitated by national leaders and widely held attitudes. Mainstream politicians have 
shown hostility to LGBT issues and have referred to Pride as a ‘security issue’. Figures in the 
Orthodox Church equate homosexuality with paedophilia and have spoken against Pride. The 
state has done little to prosecute those involved in attacks on the Pride marches in 2001 and 
2010. The march in 2010 was protected by 5,000 police, but there were nevertheless attacks 
elsewhere in the city. The march was not allowed to go ahead in 2011-13, but resumed in 2014. 
These views are supported by significant portions of the population. A survey from 2010, 
‘specifically examining the attitudes towards homosexuality, show[ed] that two thirds of the 
population of Serbia still [thought] that homosexuality is a disease, while more than half 
believe[d] that homosexuality is dangerous for society (56 per cent) and that state institutions 
should work on suppressing homosexuality (53 per cent). More than one third of the population 
(38 per cent) agree[d] with the claim that homosexuality was fabricated in the West, with the aim 
of destroying the family and Serbian tradition.’ In addition, 45% saw Pride as a ‘provocation’ 
against ‘normal’ people and 20% saw violence against Pride as justifiable (Stakic, 2019).  
International links 
The Serbian Radical Party has branches in Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro and North 
Macedonia in line with its ethnic nationalist views. Far-right groups have undertaken a number of 
acts in Kosovo. 
Ana Devic has traced the links between Serbian and Russian extremists.  These include 
academic and para-academic links, such as media coverage of the ‘Eurasianist’ philosopher 
Alexander Dugin in Serbia. Russian far right parties such as ‘Kosovo Front’, sometimes with 
close ties to the government, have invited Serbian groups to the country on several occasions. 
Devic relates how the ‘SNP Naši delegation was counselled by a Russian Orthodox priest in the 
Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius, the largest pilgrimage and monastic centre in Russia (located near 
Moscow), who introduced them to a special blend of spiritual and military survival exercises 
practiced on the temple premises. Upon learning that there were around three thousand such 
church-military societies in Russia, gathering teenage and older youth, the Serbian Naši vouched 
that they would establish such clubs in Serbia as well.’ The Serbian far right group Zavetnici have 
been guests of the ruling United Russian party at the Duma (Devic, 2019). 
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Most of the literature on extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina focuses on Islamic groups among 
the Bosniak population. However, there is a least one secular organisation that can be classified 
as far right. The Bosnian Movement of National Pride, BPNP, is a far-right Bosniak organisation 
based on ethnicity rather than religion. It is antisemitic, anti-communist and aims to prevent the 
secession of Serb and Croat populations (Ristic et al., 2017).  
Right-wing extremism centres on the ethnic Serb population, centred in the Republika Srpska. 
Milorad Dodik, the Serb representative in the country’s tripartite presidency, has engaged in 
nationalistic rhetoric. For instance, he ‘has disputed that a genocide of Bosnian Muslims took 
place in Srebrenica’ and honours convicted war criminals (Hussain, 2018) 
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It is estimated that seven citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have travelled to fight in Ukraine, 
and some have also travelled to fight in the pro-Russian Serbian Hussar Regiment in Syria. They 
travelled through Serbia where they were helped by the Serbian Chetnik group (Hamideicevic & 
Plevljak, 2018, p. 57). 
As in Serbia, this is partly facilitated by a permissive environment. An Atlantic Initiative survey of 
2,110 citizens of Bosnia Herzegovina and 12 focus groups found much higher support among 
Serbs for fighters going to Ukraine, than from Bosniaks for fighters going to Iraq or Syria. 
See Figure 1: Support for joining foreign conflicts (Atlantic Initiative, 2018:1)  
 
http://atlantskainicijativa.org/wp-content/uploads/CVE-Baseline-Research-Findings-December-
2018.pdf   
 
They show that for Serbs, ethno-nationalist violent extremism was ‘associated with feelings of 
stability, agency, and safety’ and had not been condemned by political or religious leaders.  
The research showed some factors which might predict a person’s likelihood of undertaking 
violent extremism (VE): 'There is no evidence that level of education, marital status, employment 
status, or frequency of Internet use are associated with VE sympathy. Support for women’s 
empowerment is powerfully associated with resiliency to VE. Other potential resiliencies include 
living in an urban location and having a more active online presence. However, more research is 
needed to determine if these are causal relationships.' In addition, 'Witnessing or falling victim to 
a VE incident or act of violence more generally is a moderate to strong predictor of vulnerability 
to VE' (Atlantic Initiative, 2018). 
5. North Macedonia 
Macedonia has ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian nationalists. The former focus on 
revising the borders with Greece and Bulgaria and the dispute over the country’s name. Albanian 
nationalists advocate a more federal Macedonia (ie more autonomy for ethnic Albanians) or a 
greater Albania.  
The Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001) ended a conflict between ethnic Albanians and the 
Macedonian state and guaranteed more rights to Albanians. Another reference point for far right 
groups is the Bucharest Treaty (1913) which saw Greece and Bulgaria win territory that 
nationalists believe is Macedonian. Greece’s objection to the country using the name 
‘Macedonia’, backed with a veto on Nato membership, saw the country call itself the ‘Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ until a compromise of ‘North Macedonia’ was agreed in 2018.   
Macedonian groups have links abroad. Albanian extreme groups link with counterparts in Albania 
and Kosovo. The attempted coup in 2017 involved a Serbian who had fought in Ukraine (Institute 
for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018). 
Ethnic Macedonian extremist organisations 
Figure 2: Ethnic Macedonian right-wing parties  
Group Aims 
12 
TMORO-VEP 
(Tatkovinska 
Makedonska 
Organizacija 
za Radikalna 
Obnova – 
Vardar Egej 
Pirin) 
 
Established in 2006, TMORO refers to the old Macedonian national 
liberation movement, while VEP refers to the ‘wider Macedonia’. 
 
It calls for the revision of borders with Bulgaria and Greece set out in the 
1913 Bucharest Peace Treaty. 
 
It wants a state for ethnic Macedonians, and is therefore against the 2001 
Ohrid Framework agreement with the Albanian NLA (National Liberation 
Army). 
It has achieved only small vote shares but has been in coalition with the 
VMRO-Democratic Party and VMRO-DPMNE in 2009 and 2011. 
TMRO 
Established in 2002, TMRO is the name of the old Macedonian national 
liberation movement. 
 
It wants to put Macedonia on the Balkan agenda, as well as good relations 
with US, Turkey and Israel, as it sees parallels between Macedonia’s 
situation and Israel’s. It wants a neutral status for the country. 
 
It is against 1913 Bucharest Treaty and wants lands returned based on 
disputed claims of large numbers of ethnic Macedonians in Greece, Bulgaria 
and Albanian. 
It has also worked in coalitions. 
People’s 
Movement of 
Macedonia 
(NDM) 
It was established in 2002. It is against the Ohrid Framework. 
 
It seeks to expand Macedonia to its ‘ethnic borders’ and aims for ‘redefining 
the state organisation on the basis of the ASNOM (Anti-Fascist Assembly for 
the People’s Liberation of Macedonia) Manifesto of 1944 and the 1991 
Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia’. 
 
It pro-EU and Nato, but believes the issue of the country’s name is more 
important. 
 
It harbours conspiracy theories and has sought to put criminal charges 
against people it believes are ‘spies’. 
 
Its economic ideas are left wing. 
It has served in coalitions. 
World 
Macedonian 
Congress 
(WMC) 
The Congress works for the ‘rights and interests of Macedonians’ in 
Macedonia and other countries, including the name dispute. 
 
It believes the 2002 census over-counted Albanians in the country. 
It has not stood for election. 
Source: (Saveski & Sadiku, 2012). 
There are also Neo-Nazis among ethnic Macedonian populations in Bitola and Skopje. Their 
activities centre on paining swastikas, Celtic crosses or the name of the football ultras group 
‘Komiti’. They have also desecrated Jewish cemeteries and placed an obituary for Rudolph Hess 
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in the local paper. They show ‘extreme hatred towards Albanians, Greeks and Roma, by their 
talk of purifying Macedonia’ (Saveski & Sadiku, 2012). 
Extremism is shared by and enabled by mainstream political parties. VMRO-DPMNE is the 
country’s main centre-right party and has been the main party in government since 2006. 
VMRO–NP, a more radical right wing party split from VMRO-DPMNE and won six seats in 2006, 
but none in later elections (Stojarová, 2014, pp. 36–37). VRMO-DPMNE’s ethnonationalist 
programme has included renaming buildings and streets with names from antiquity in order to 
evoke Macedonian nationalism and minimise the Albanian presence (Ceka, 2018). It has brought 
ultranationalism into the mainstream, including working in coalition with the above-mentioned 
extremist parties. In addition, ‘in the city of Bitola, where VMRO-DPMNE has been in power since 
2005, the local authorities have for years ignored the fact that swastikas have been painted in 
many public locations, including the centre of the city’ (Saveski & Sadiku, 2012). Several 
‘patriotic’ NGOs have also been formed with strong links to the ruling VRMO-DPMNE party since 
2017 (Ristic et al., 2017). 
Ethnic Albanian extremist organisations 
Figure 3: Ethnic Albanian nationalist organisations 
Group Aims 
National Democratic Union Established in 2007, this organisation has little support and 
no seats. 
It undertakes rallies and protests and calls for the 
Federalisation of Macedonia. 
Illyricum Libertas This organisation has fewer than 12 members.  It is linked 
with Kosovo. 
It calls for the unification of Balkan Albanians, through 
peaceful means. 
It is active in Tetovo and works mainly through graffiti and 
online messages. 
Ballista A group for fans of the football team Shkendija from Tetovo. 
It is made up of youths and students. 
It calls for a federal Macedonia. It sings anti-Slav and anti-
Serb songs. 
It has little influence but is nevertheless a mobilising force 
Source: (Saveski & Sadiku, 2012). 
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In addition the ‘Army of the Republic of Ilirida was created in 2002 in Macedonia, fighting for the 
annexation of western Macedonia to either Kosovo or Albania. The group allegedly has around 
200 members, who are said to have sworn loyalty to Leka Zogu’ (Stojarová, 2014, p. 140). 
Of the mainstream parties, the most important is the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). 
Although it participated in the Ohrid Agreements, it uses strong rhetoric against it (Saveski & 
Sadiku, 2012). 
6. Montenegro 
According to a 2014 publication, ‘there are currently no extreme Right-wing parties defining 
themselves as ethnic Montenegrin – Montenegrin identity has so far been too inclusive to allow 
for such a political agenda. When independence was declared, the only Far Right entities were 
subregional in nature (Albanian formations claiming Greater Albania) or sister parties of Serbian 
radical entities seeking the creation of Greater Serbia’ (Stojarová, 2014). Nationalism is dominant 
in the country and Montenegrin ‘populism’ combines elements of right and left wing populism with 
clientelism (Džankić & Keil, 2017). 
Since then, five Montenegrins are reported to have fought for the Russian side in Ukraine. Four 
escaped prosecution as they returned to Montenegro before a change in the law to allow the 
prosecution of foreign fighters. The fifth was prosecuted for participated in a foreign armed 
formation, rather than the charge against the Montenegrin who fought for the Islamic State – 
terrorism. An alleged attempted coup in 2016 involved Russian nationals as well as the Serbian 
national Aleksandar Sindjelic, who has previously fought in Ukraine for the Russians (Institute for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018, p. 92). 
7. Kosovo 
Kosovo has two types of right-wing extremism: Albanian nationalism, calling Kosovan 
independence and for links with ethnic Albanians in Albania, Serbia and Macedonia; and 
nationalism among the ethnic Serbian minority.  
Serb nationalists are linked with the Serbian National Party and Obraz (see section on Serbia). A 
report by the Kosovan government says that Serbian extremist groups attack Albanian citizens 
and Kosovan institutions, and are linked with criminals from northern Kosovan and financed by 
the Serbian government in order to oppose Kosovan independence (Kosovo, 2015). However, 
given relations between Serbia and Kosovo, this may be exaggerated. 
Ethnic Albanian groups work alongside organisations in south-eastern Serbia, Albania and 
Western Macedonia, and communicate with the Albanian Front of National Unifi cation (Fronti 
Për Bashkim Kombëtar Shqiptar , FBKSH) in Tirana (Stojarová, 2014, p. 140). However, 
accroding to Stojarova, the ‘declared fight for Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo serves as a 
cover for OC profit-making activities rather than working for the liberation of the Albanian nation 
(Stojarová, 2014, p. 140). 
8. Albania 
Most of the literature on extremism in Albania focuses on Islamic extremism. Right-wing 
extremism is centred on ethnic nationalism. 
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The National Front (Balli Kombëtar, BK) won two seats in 1996, three in 1997, and three in 2001, 
when it was part of the Union for Victory Coalition (46 seats out of 140). It did not win any seats 
in 2005 or 2009. The PBKD (Balli Kombëtar Demokrat [Democratic National Front Party]) broke 
away from the BK in 1998 (Buštíková, 2018). The other right wing parties are the Legality 
Movement Party (Partia Lëvizja e Legalitetit, PLL) and the Albanian National Unity Party (Partia 
Bashkesia Kombetare Shqiptare, PBKSh). Neither had won seats in the National Assembly 
(Stojarová, 2014, pp. 36–37). 
Outside of parliament, the ‘Albanian National Army (ANA) fights for a ‘greater Albania’, and 
operates in Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and northern Greece. However, little is 
known about the organisation, including the name of its leader, or its aims. It tried to assassinate 
the president of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, in 2005, and has an internet presence. According to 
Stojarová, it ‘oscillates somewhere between a militia, paramilitary organization and insurgent 
group using terrorist means linked to the organised crime’ (Stojarová, 2014, p. 140). 
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